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Introduction
Digital signatures are widely deployed around the world and have the backing of significant international legislation to support their use in electronic environment. One of these cryptographic primitives is proxy ring signature which supports ensuring service availability for the customers in distributed networks to avoid the dependency to a single server in addition to preserving privacy of proxy signers. In this work, we are interested in exploring proxy ring signatures in the identity-based setting, due to its practicality.
Identity-based cryptography. Public-key cryptography has many different applications, but in its basic form, it requires extensive public-key infrastructure for practical use. In order to provide more flexible management of public keys the notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [1] . The main feature of identity-based cryptosystems is to remove the requirement of certification of the public keys. The public key of each party is obtained from its public identity, such as the IP address or email address, which can uniquely identify the party. Since the introduction of the notion in [1] , various identity based schemes ( [2] [3] [4] ) have been proposed.
Identity-based cryptography has attracted a lot of interest since the elliptic curve pairings are shown to provide an elegant way for implementing identity-based encryption schemes. In the past ten years, the majority of identity-based cryptosystems proposed have relied on pairings. While extensive research has led to vast improvements in implementation of pairings, their computational cost is still higher than that of traditional public key algorithms which use the exponentiation operation in various groups. Moreover, pairing-based cryptosystems rely on newer and less analyzed computational assumptions in their security analysis compared to traditional schemes that are based on classical assumptions like the widely studied RSA assumption. There has been a proliferation of pairing-based assumptions whose difficulty is not widely understood and whose connection to established assumptions, and to each other, remains unknown [5] . Therefore, when designing new identity-based cryptographic primitives it is desirable to diversify the computational assumptions and to use widely accepted assumptions where possible.
Proxy ring signatures. The notion of proxy signatures was introduced by Mambo et al. [6] in 1996. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer, Alice, can delegate her signing right for signing messages to another signer, Bob, called the proxy signer. Since the introduction of the notion of proxy signatures, several variants of proxy signatures such as proxy signatures from RSA and integer factorization problem ( [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ), identity-based proxy signature schemes based on bilinear pairings ( [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] ), designated-verifier proxy signatures ( [20] [21] [22] ), short proxy signature [23] , proxy verifiably encrypted signatures [24] , proxy signature schemes without random oracles [25] , identity-based multi-proxy signatures [26] , proxy ring signatures ( [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] ) and identity-based proxy ring signatures from bilinear pairings ( [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ) have been proposed.
In a proxy ring signature scheme, an original signer can delegate her signing right for signing messages to a group of proxy signers with different public keys, called the proxy agent, such that only one of the proxy signers in the proxy group can generate proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer while he could be anonymous. As mentioned in ( [27] [28] [29] ), this primitive can be used when the requirement of proxy signer's privacy protection is necessary. For example, it is assumed that a parliament member would like to reveal an important news on behalf of the cabinet, while he wants to be anonymous. However, one still needs to verify public keys of proxy signers and the original signer in addition to verifying the validity of a proxy ring signature.
Cheng et al. proposed the first identity-based proxy ring signature [35] to facilitate public key certificate management of these kinds of signatures by merely employing signer's identities in place of the public keys and their certificates. Subsequently, there have been some follow-up works in the area of identity-based proxy ring signatures ( [32] [33] [34] [36] [37] [38] [39] ), but unfortunately, none of them supports provable security. Hence, the formal definition and security model for identity-based proxy ring signature schemes do not yet exist in the literature.
In the proxy key exposure attack [40] proposed by Schuldt et al., it is assumed that temporal secret keys of proxy signers stored in a less trusted device can be leaked, while secure storage (for example in a TPM within a laptop) is available for long term secret keys of proxy signers. With this attack not only long term secret keys of proxy signers are compromised but also an adversary (with having proxy secret keys) can generate valid (identity-based) proxy signatures. Therefore, it is vital to consider the proxy key exposure attack when we present other extensions of proxy signatures, identity-based proxy ring signatures. Unfortunately, identity-based proxy ring signatures proposed in ( [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ) are vulnerable to this attack.
Our Contribution
The main goal of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature, by proposing a formal definition and security model for identity-based proxy ring signatures. Subsequently, we present the first provably secure identitybased proxy ring signature scheme. The paradigm used in designing this primitive is sequential aggregation of an identity-based signature and an identity-based ring signature scheme. As a result, our scheme is the first identity-based proxy ring signature scheme such that the proxy key exposure attack [40] cannot be applied to it. We achieved this by employing sequential aggregation of two signatures (i.e., the original signer's signature and the proxy signer's ring signature). This is in contrast to the previous technique that employs proxy key generation algorithm, a function of delegation and proxy long term secret key, to generate proxy secret key. The latter is vulnerable to the proxy key exposure attack since proxy secret keys are assumed to be stored on a less trusted device and there is a possibility that the adversary can find proxy secret keys and then proxy long term secret keys are compromised [40] .
To prove security of the scheme, we present a new forking lemma and employ it in the proof of unforgeability. The general forking lemma [41] cannot be applied directly into our scheme since this scheme is the result of sequential aggregation of two different types of signatures such that we have two different types of random oracle responses. Hence, we need to consider the probability of happening some random responses before the forking point in the proposed forking lemma which makes it different from previous forking lemma.
We should highlight that our scheme not only is the first identity-based proxy ring signature with provable security according to a formally defined security model and is resistance against proxy key exposure attack, but also it is the first identity-based proxy ring signature from RSA, which is more efficient than the existing constructions due to not relying on pairing computations.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notations and RSA complexity assumption employed as the signature foundation. The security model of identity-based proxy ring signature including outline of the identity-based proxy signature scheme and its security properties are given in Section 2. The proposed scheme and its formal security proofs are presented in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 present the comparison and conclusion.
Background
In this section, first we give notations used throughout the paper and review the RSA assumption, and then we present the outline and our security definitions for the identity-based proxy ring signature schemes.
Notations.
If S is a set, then s $ ← S denotes the operation of assigning to s an element of S chosen uniformly at random, and if (i 0 , ..., i z ) is a vector, then i ∈ (i 0 , ..., i z ) means that ∃0 ≤ u ≤ z i = i u . If x 1 , x 2 , ... are objects then x 1 ||x 2 ||... denotes an encoding of them as strings from which the constituent objects are effectively recoverable. Let ⊥ be an empty string and θ ← C(x 1 , ...) stands for the operation of assigning the output of algorithm C on inputs x 1 , ... to θ. Let A be an algorithm which has access to H, K, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign oracles of a signature scheme, and can win a game in which a security property of the scheme is violated by A. If algorithm A is (t, q h , q k , q e , q d , q prs , )-bounded, we mean that the algorithm A which runs in time at most t, makes at most q h queries to random oracle H, q k queries to random oracle K, q e queries to KeyExtract oracle, q d queries to DelegationGen and q prs queries to ProxyRingSign oracle can win the game with probability at least . If probability of an algorithm in doing some tasks is negligible, it means that its value is less than inverse of a polynomial of input's length for all sufficiently large values of input's length.
The RSA assumption.
An RSA key generator KG rsa is an algorithm that generates triplets (N, e, d) such that N is the product of two large primes p and q and ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ), where ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The advantage of an algorithm B in breaking the one-wayness of RSA related to KG rsa is defined as
We say that B, (t , )-breaks the one-wayness of RSA with respect to KG rsa if it runs in time at most t and has advantage Adv ow−rsa KGrsa (B) ≥ . We say that the RSA function associated to KG rsa is (t , )-one-way if no algorithm B, can (t , )-break it.
Outline of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes
When describing the signature scheme, let identity of each original signer be ID 0 , and identity set of proxy agent and each subset of that be ID and ID, respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global meaning outside this protocol instance which means that there is no certified relationship between indices and identities, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers. An identity-based proxy ring signature scheme consists of five algorithms: ParaGen, KeyExtract, DelegationGen, ProxyRingSign and ProxyRingVer as follows.
-ParaGen: This algorithm takes as input the system security parameter l and outputs system's parameters P ara and the system's master key (msk, mpk), i.e. (P ara, (msk, mpk)) ← P araGen(l).
-KeyExtract: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, master public key mpk, master secret key msk, and an identity ID u . It outputs the corresponding secret key x u for the identity ID u , i.e. x u ← KeyExtract(P ara, mpk, msk, ID u ).
-DelegationGen: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, an identity ID 0 and an identity set ID, including at least two identities, for an original signer and a proxy agent, respectively. It also takes as input the secret key x 0 of the original signer with identity ID 0 and a message space descriptor w ⊆ {0, 1} * for which the original signer with identity ID 0 delegates its signing right to a proxy agent with identity set ID, then, it outputs a delegation σ 0 ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, w, x 0 ).
-ProxyRingSign: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the identity set ID of proxy signers including at least two identities, a valid delegation σ 0 for a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers such that ID ⊆ ID and the delegation indicates that an original signer with identity ID 0 delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity set ID, a proxy signer's secret key x j corresponding to an identity ID j $ ← ID ⊆ ID and a message m ∈ w, then, it outputs the identity-based proxy ring signature θ on behalf of the original signer with identity ID 0 , i.e. θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, ID, (m, w, σ 0 ), x j ).
-ProxyRingVer: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, an original signer's identity ID 0 , the proxy signers' identity sets ID and ID, a message space descriptor w, a signed message m and a proxy ring signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based proxy ring signature of the message m which means that it satisfies the verification equation, m ∈ w and ID ⊆ ID and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← P roxyRingV er(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, ID, w, m, θ).
Security models of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes
An identity-based proxy ring signature must satisfy two independent notions of security: unforgeability and privacy of proxy signer' identity. We present the first formal definitions for unforgeability and privacy of proxy signer's identity, respectively. To achieve existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message (chosen warrant: chosen message space descriptor and identity set of proxy signers) and chosen identity attack for identity-based proxy ring signature schemes, three types of potential adversaries as mentioned in [27] are considered as follows.
-Type I: This type adversary A I only has identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers. -Type II: This type adversary A II has secret keys of some (one/all) proxy signers in a proxy group in addition to identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers. -Type III: This type adversary A III has the secret key of the original signer in addition to identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
Clearly, if an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is secure against Type II (or Type III) adversaries then it is also secure against Type I adversary. Unforgeability against Type I, Type II and Type III adversaries (A I , A II and A III ) is formalized using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
1. Setup: C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system's parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to A.
A issues a polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles adaptively:
KeyExtract queries:
A can ask for the secret key corresponding to each identity ID u , then C returns the private key x u to the adversary with running the KeyExtract algorithm.
3. DelegationGen queries: Adversary A can request a delegation under the identity ID 0 of an original signer on a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of its choice for which the original signer with identity ID 0 delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity set ID. In response, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key x 0 of the original signer, and returns σ 0 ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, w, x 0 ) to A.
ProxyRingSign queries:
Adversary A can request the proxy ring signature of m w.r.t. ID to C. In addition, adversary A provides a delegation σ 0 of an original signer with identity ID 0 for a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers. This delegation was obtained from DelegationGen algorithm or was generated by adversary A. Algorithm C checks that σ 0 is a valid delegation in which the original signer with identity ID 0 delegates its signing right for the message space descriptor w to the proxy agent with identity set ID; that ID ⊆ ID; and that m ∈ w. If any of these fails to hold, returns ⊥. Otherwise, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key x j corresponding to one of the proxy signers with identity ID j such that ID j $ ← ID. Next, C runs ProxyRingSign algorithm θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, ID, (m, w, σ 0 ), x j ) to generate the proxy ring signature θ and returns it to the adversary A. The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary A I is expressed in Definition 1.
Definition 1. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, q h , q e , q d , q prs , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, q h , q e , q d , q prs , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game. Definition 2. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, q h , q e , q d , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, q h , q e , q d , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game. The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary A III is expressed in Definition 3.
Definition 3. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, q h , q e , q prs , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, q h , q e , q prs , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
Privacy of proxy signer's identity (PPSI) in an identity-based proxy ring signature means that it should be infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) distinguisher D to tell which proxy signer in a proxy group generates θ on a message m. To have a formal definition for this property consider the following game between a challenger C and a distinguisher D.
1. Setup: C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system's parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to D.
The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the forgery game.
2. the distinguisher D chooses two honest identities ID 1 and ID 2 (D never make KeyExtract query for these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an identity ID 0 and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID = {ID 1 , ID 2 } ⊆ ID, respectively.
In response, C chooses j $ ← {1, 2}, runs KeyExtract for ID 0 and ID j to obtain their corresponding secret keys, and runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under the identity ID 0 to obtain σ 0 and returns θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, ID, (w, m, σ 0 ), x j ) to D. 3. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j and wins the game if j = j.
The formal definition for privacy of proxy signer's identity is given in definition 4. If the probability is equal to 1 2 , the scheme satisfies privacy of the proxy signer's identity perfectly.
Our identity-based proxy ring signature scheme
In this section, we present an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme using a new paradigm called sequential aggregation of GQ identity-based signature [42] and GQ identity-based ring signature scheme [43] . The main reason of employing this paradigm is to ensure that the proxy key exposure attack does not have any impact on the scheme. Our scheme generates an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme in a way that a delegation is original signer's GQ identity-based signature on a message space descriptor and proxy signers' identities concatenated with "11" 4 to differentiate delegations from standard signatures, and a proxy ring signature is sequential aggregation of a delegation and a ring signature generated by one of the proxy signers on a message, which belongs to the message space descriptor concatenated with "11" to differentiate them from sequential aggregation of delegations and ordinary ring signatures generated by proxy signers. We note that the trick to concatenate with "11", as suggested by Boldyreva et al. [44] , prevents trivial attacks to the scheme.
Details of identity-based proxy ring signature scheme
In this section, we present the details of identity-based proxy ring signature scheme. When describing the signature scheme, let identity of each original signer be ID 0 , and identity set of each proxy agent and each subset of that be ID and ID, respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global meaning outside this protocol instance which means that there is no certified relationship between indices and identities, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers.
It is assumed that n ≥ 2 is the number of identities for proxy signers in the proxy agent, and z ≥ 2 is the size of each subset ID of ID. Our scheme consists of five algorithms as follows.
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l 1 and l N ∈ N and let K : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l1 and H : {0, 1} * → Z * N be random oracles. Let KG rsa be a RSA key pair generator that outputs triplets (N, e, d) such that ϕ(N ) > 2 l N and with prime encryption exponents e of length strictly greater than l 1 bits. The key distribution center runs KG rsa to generate RSA parameters (N, e, d). It publishes mpk = (N, e) as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = d secret. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {K, H} and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = d and the user identity ID u , the key distribution center computes x u = H(ID u ) d mod N , and sends the user secret key x u over a secure and authenticated channel to the user with identity ID u .
3. DelegationGen: Let w be a message space descriptor for which an original signer with identity ID 0 would like to delegate her signing right to a group of proxy signers with an identity set ID, the delegation is σ 0 = (R 0 , s 0 ) = (r 
Analysis of the scheme
In this section, we verify the correctness, and prove the privacy of the proxy signer's identity and existential unforgeability of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model (see [45] for the background).
In order to prove unforgeability of the proposed scheme, we need to show that it is unforgeable against adversaries of types II and III (as defined in Section 2.4). Since our security proofs are quite similar in both cases, we have parametrized these proofs to prevent unnecessary repetitions of arguments. Hence, just for notational settings, we refer to the adversary as A (1−ζ)II+ζIII in which the parameter ζ ∈ {0, 1} makes the difference between adversaries of types II and III (i.e. notationally we assume that we have an adversary of type II, A II , when ζ = 0 and an adversary of type III, A III , when ζ = 1). Note that, the proofs for different values of ζ are independent.
To prove the security of our proposed scheme, and by contradiction, assuming an adversary A (1−ζ)II+ζIII , we show that there is a solver (algorithm B) that can solve a random instance of the RSA problem with a non-negligible probability. To do this, we first show that there exists a simulator called C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII that can simulate the signature scheme without knowing the secret key(s) of the honest signer(s), and runs the adversary A (1−ζ)II+ζIII as its sub-routine. In this regard, we compute the run-time and a lower-bound for the success (returning a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) (see Definition 5)) probability of this simulator in terms of the run-time and success (returning a valid forgery θ = (R 0 , ..., R z , s, c 0 , ..., c z ) on a message m under the message space descriptor w w.r.t. original signer's identity ID 0 and a subset ID ⊆ ID of proxy signers) probability of the adversary and the number of queries to the oracles (see Lemma 1) .
At the final stage, we use a forking strategy to solve an instance (N, e, y) of the RSA problem, using a useful pair (see Definition 6) of the simulator C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII when the random string used in both simulations are the same. Hence, we concentrate on computing a lower bound for the probability of producing such a useful pair and solving the RSA instance as the main body of the solver algorithm B (see Lemma 3) . We should highlight that the general Forking Lemma [41] cannot be applied directly into our scheme since this scheme is the result of sequential aggregation of two different types of signatures such that we have two different types of random oracle responses. Hence, we need to consider the probability of happening some random responses before the forking point in the proposed forking lemma, and this is the main difference of our Forking Lemma from previous ones.
Our main result on the security of the proposed scheme is summarized in Theorem 1, where the parameter ζ is used to code the result for both adversaries of types II and III.
To start let us verify the correctness of the proposed scheme. Note that, all computations are done modulo N , but we omit this for simplicity.
The equality r e = R j [ u =j H(ID u ) cu ] mod N is used in Eq. (2). 
Lemma 1. Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} and z ≥ 2 be a constant and l N be a security parameter. Assuming the existence of an (t, q h , q k , q e , (1 − ζ)q d , ζq prs , )-bounded adversary A (1−ζ)II+ζIII with success probability at least and run-time t, there exists a simulator C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII for the signature scheme that does not use the secret key(s) of the honest signer(s), and produces a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) such that, a) the success probability of C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII is greater than
where t exp is the time of one exponentiation in Z * N , and q h , q k , q e , q d and q prs are the number of queries to the random oracle H, the random oracle K, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign oracle, respectively.
Proof. Assume the existence of an (t, q h , q k , q e , ζq d , (1 − ζ)q prs , )-bounded adversary A (1−ζ)II+ζIII on the public data mpk = (N, e) which runs in time at most t, makes q h queries to the random oracle H, q k queries to the random oracle K, q e queries to the KeyExtract, (1 − ζ)q d queries to the DelegationGen and ζq prs queries to ProxyRingSign oracle, and can win the unforgeability game with probability at least . The algorithm C and in ProxyRingSign Q = (R u ||ID|| ID||R 0 ||w||m||11).
-H(ID u ) queries: We employ Coron's technique [46] to obtain a tighter security bound when simulating H. To lower-bound the probability that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort at answering to queries of
, where events bad KE , bad DG and bad P S indicate that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII aborts in signature simulation as a result of any of A (1−ζ)II+ζIII 's KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries, respectively. These probabilities are computed as follows.
Proof. Pr[¬bad KE ] is the probability that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort as a result of A (1−ζ)II+ζIII 's KeyExtract queries. The algorithm C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII aborts at answering to a KeyExtract query when bad KE is set to true which means that b = 1 for a given identity. The probability of this event is 1 − β, so the probability that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort for one KeyExtract query is β. Since A (1−ζ)II+ζIII makes at most q e KeyExtract queries, the probability that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII does not abort as a result of q e KeyExtract queries is at least β qe . for one DelegationGen query (w, ID) equals the probability that (R 0 ||w||ID||11) generated in a DelegationGen simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle K. Since there are at most q k + q d entries in the table T K [.] for these kinds of queries and the number of R 0 , uniformly distributed in Z N , is 2 l N , the probability of this event for one DelegationGen query is at most (q d + q k )2 −l N . Hence, the probability of this event for q d queries is at most
In addition, this probability includes the probability that C A II previously used the same randomness R 0 , uniformly distributed in Z N , in one DelegationGen simulation. Since there are at most q d DelegationGen simulations, this probability is at most q d 2 −l N . Therefore, for q d DelegationGen queries the probability of this event is at most q
Proof. Events ¬bad KE and ¬bad P S are independent, so Pr[¬bad P S |¬bad KE ] = Pr[¬bad P S ]. The value of Pr[¬bad P S ] is the probability that C A III does not abort as a result of ProxyRingSign queries. The algorithm C A III aborts at answering to a ProxyRingSign query if bad P S is set to true which means that there is a conflict in table T K [.] for these kinds of queries. The probability of finding a conflict in T K [.] for one ProxyRingSign query equals the probability that (R j ||ID|| ID||R 0 ||w||m||11) generated in ProxyRingSign simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle K. Since there are at most q k +q prs entries in the table T K [.] for these kinds of queries and the number of R j , uniformly distributed in Z N , is 2 l N , the probability of this event for one ProxyRingSign is at most (q prs +q k )2 −l N . Hence, the probability of this event for q prs queries is at most q prs (q prs + q k )2 −l N . In addition, this probability includes the probability that C A III previously used the same randomness R j , uniformly distributed in Z N , in one ProxyRingSign simulation. Since there are at most q prs ProxyRingSign simulations, this probability is at most q prs 2 −l N . Therefore, for q prs ProxyRingSign queries the probability of this event is at most q
Finally, it is assumed that A (1−ζ)II+ζIII outputs a valid forgery θ = (R 0 , ..., R z , s, c 0 , ..., c z ) on a message m under message space descriptor w w.r.t. original signer's identity ID 0 and proxy signers' identity sets ID and ID with probability at least in time bound t. Since the forgery is valid, we have
and A II has not asked (w, ID) from DelegationGen algorithm under original signer's identity ID 0 and A III has not asked the message m from ProxyRingSign algorithm under proxy signer's identity set ID ⊆ ID. In addition, a valid forgery has to contain one uncorrupted identity or z uncorrupted identities for A II and A III , respectively. These probabilities are computed as follows.
Claim 4. The probability that A II outputs a valid forgery including one uncorrupted identity is at least (1 − β).
Proof. It is assumed that A II outputs a valid forgery with probability at least . The probability that a valid forgery contains one uncorrupted identity is 1 − β. The probability of existence of one honest identity with b = 1 is 1 − β. Therefore, the probability that A II outputs a valid forgery containing one uncorrupted identity is at least (1 − β).
Claim 5. The probability that A III outputs a valid forgery including z uncorrupted identities is at least
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 4.
Therefore, the probability that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII returns a useful output is at least
. With substituting the value of β, we obtain β qe (1−β) = (
If q e = 0, this value is 1 and (1 − 1 qe+1 ) 1+qe is a monotonically increasing sequence for q e ≥ 1. Therefore, the lower bound of β
. Similarly, the value of β
To estimate the required time of C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII in returning a useful output, the required time t C in which C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII answers A (1−ζ)II+ζIII 's queries is computed as follows. Since it is assumed that a (multi-) exponentiation in Z N takes time t exp while all other operations take zero time, each random oracle or KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a delegation simulation takes 2 exponentiations, and a proxy ring signature simulation takes 2z exponentiations, we therefore have that t C ≤ (1q e + 1q h + (1 − ζ)2q d + ζ2zq prs )t exp .
Finally, C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII performs additional random oracle queries H(ID u ) for identities in the forgery to find T [ID u ] = (b, x u , X u ) for them, and returns ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability at least ζ( 2 2z q z e − (2q
Also, in what follows we will be needing the following Splitting lemma.
then the following statements hold:
Definition 6. Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} be a constant. A pair of useful outputs ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) and ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s , {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m , w ) is said to be a useful pair if R u = R u , 0 ≤ u ≤ z, s = s , c u = c u for one 0 ≤ u ≤ z and c u = c u other u, x u = x u , 0 ≤ u ≤ z, m = m and w = w hold. . .., Q qt ) made to the random oracle K. A pair of (ω, ρ) is said to be a successful pair if C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII produces a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) based on them.
Lemma 3. (A Forking Lemma). Let ζ ∈ {0, 1} be a constant, z and l 1 be the number of proxy signers in a proxy ring and a security parameter, respectively. Also let K be a random oracle, and q t be the total number of queries to K. It is assumed that C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII returns a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability at least ε in time bound τ . Then, a replay of C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII with the same random string and a different random oracle gives a useful pair in time t ≤ 2τ with probability ≥
, where By hypothesis, for a random choice of (ω, ρ), C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII produces a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability at least ε in time bound τ .
Since K is a random oracle, the probability of the event
for 1 ≤ u ≤ z is less than (z + 1)2 −l1 , unless they are asked during the attack. Hence, it is likely that the questions (R u ||ID|| ID||R 0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z and (R 0 ||w||ID||11) are asked during a successful attack. We define set Υ as the set of successful pairs (ω, ρ), Υ = {(ω, ρ)| C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII (ω) produces a useful output & ∞ / ∈ (i 0 , ..., i z )}. The lower bound of probability of producing a useful output is 1 = Pr[Υ ] ≥ ε−(z+1)2 −l1 , and let κ = max{i ∈ (i 0 , ..., i z )}.
We also define
Since C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII makes query to the random oracle K for a successful pair (ω, ρ) ∈ Υ , then we define set Υ i = {(ω, ρ)| C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII (ω) produces a useful output & (i 0 , ..., i z ) = i} for all vectors i ∈ I z+1 as a subset of Υ in which query Q i0 = (R 0 ||w||ID||11) was made to random oracle K before one of queries Q iu = (R u ||ID|| ID||R 0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z when ζ = 1, and when ζ = 0, queries Q iu = (R u ||ID|| ID||R 0 ||w||m||11) for 1 ≤ u ≤ z were made to random oracle K before query Q i0 = (R 0 ||w||ID||11).
The cardinality of set I z+1 in both cases is π = qt−z−1 j=1
. This gives us a partition of Υ in exactly π classes. Let I be the set consisting of most likely vectors
With splitting the randomness ρ related to the oracle K as ρ = (ρ 1 , ..., ρ κ−1 ), where ρ denotes a vector of answers to all queries to the random oracle K before index κ. We employ Splitting Lemma, taking X = (ω, ρ ), 
Since Υ i are disjoint, and we have
. Let i denote a vector of a successful pair with probability at least 1 4 , i ∈ I and (ω, ρ) ∈ Ω i ∩ Υ i . If we replay the attack with fixed (ω, ρ ) and randomly chosen (ρ κ , ..., ρ qt ), we get another successful pair (ω, (ρ , ρ κ , ..., ρ qt )) such that ρ κ = ρ κ with probability
. After two successful executions of C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII , the algorithm B obtains (ω, (ρ , ρ κ , ..., ρ qt )) and (ω, (ρ , ρ κ , ..., ρ qt )), ρ iu = ρ iu for κ ≤ i u ≤ q t which means that B obtains a useful pair ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) and ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s , {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m , w ) with probability ≥ , where 1 ≥ ε−(z+1)2 −l1 ,
The running time t of B is twice that of C A (1−ζ)II+ζIII , t ≥ 2τ . Theorem 1. If the RSA function associated to Kg rsa is (t , )-one-way, then the proposed signature scheme is (t, q h , q k , q e , (1−ζ)q d , ζq prs , )-secure against (t, q h , q k , q e , (1−ζ)q d , ζq prs , )-bounded adversary A (1−ζ)II+ζIII for a constant ζ ∈ {0, 1} such that
, t exp is the time of an exponentiation in Z * N , and z and l 1 are the number of proxy signers in a proxy ring and a security parameter, respectively.
Proof. In the proof, we consider two cases for the forgery depending on type of adversaries. In the first case, we type II adversary, while in the second one type III adversary. Then, we show that the algorithm B can solve a random instance of the RSA problem (N, e, y) such that γ = y 1 e mod N . Case 1. In this case, we consider adversaries of type II (i.e., ζ = 0). According to Lemma 1, C A II returns a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) in time τ = t + (1q e + 1q h + 2q d )t exp with probability at least ε = 4qe −(2q
Then, the algorithm B, the RSA solver, will produce a useful pair of ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) and ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s , c 0 , {c u } 1≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability at least ≥
in time t ≥ 2t+2(1q e +1q h +2q d )t exp (see Lemma 3) . Since a useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have
and
By dividing the two aforementioned equations, we obtain (x
l1 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 1 , we have e > (c 0 − c 0 ) and therefore gcd(e, (c 0 − c 0 )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that ae + b(c 0 − c 0 ) = 1. Hence, we have y = y ae+b(c0−c 0 ) = (y a (x
as the RSA inversion of y in time t with probability .
Case 2. In this case, we consider adversaries of type III (i.e., ζ = 1). According to Lemma 1, C A III returns a useful output ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) in time bound τ = t + (1q e + 1q h + 2zq prs )t exp with probability at least ε = 2 2z q z e −(2q 2 prs +q prs q k )2 −l N . Then, the algorithm B, the RSA solver, will produce a useful pair of ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s, {c u } 0≤u≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) and ({R u } 0≤u≤z , s , c κ , {c u } 0≤u =κ≤z , {x u } 0≤u≤z , m, w) with probability at least ≥ (
in time t ≥ 2t + 2(1q e + 1q h + 2zq prs )t exp (see Lemma 3) . Since a useful pair contains two useful outputs, we have
l1 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 1 , we have e > (c v − c v ) and therefore gcd(e, (c v − c v )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that ae
Theorem 2. The identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is (t, q h , q k , q e , q d , q prs , 
Proof. The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of random oracle, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the forgery game.
Then, D chooses two honest identities ID 1 and ID 2 for proxy ring (D never make KeyExtract query for these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an identity ID 0 and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID = {ID 1 , ID 2 } ⊆ ID, respectively. In response, C chooses j $ ← {1, 2}, runs KeyExtract for ID 0 and ID j to obtain their corresponding secret keys, then runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under an identity ID 0 to obtain σ 0 and returns θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID 0 , ID, ID, (w, m, σ 0 ), x j ) to D. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j = j with probability 1 2 . To show the value of this probability, we compute the probability that ID j generates valid values for R 1 and R 2 of θ which are pairwise different. The probability of choosing different values for . Then, s is computed from random numbers r u for u = j in R u and r employed in R j . The probability of generation of the proxy ring signature θ = (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , s) is independent from the identity of the real signer ID j , then, this probability is the same for two members in the set of proxy signers. Therefore, the probability of D in guessing the real signer is 
Comparison
The comparison for some provably secure (identity-based) proxy ring signature schemes is summarized in Table 1 . The comparison is in terms of DeleGen-Cost, DeleVer-Cost , PRSign-Cost and PRVer-Cost , dominating computational cost in delegation generation, delegation verification, proxy ring signature generation and proxy ring signature verification, respectively. In Table 1 , P , e G , m G2 , exp and m N denote the pairing evaluation, exponentiation in group G, pairing multiplication in G 2 , exponentiation in Z * N and multiplication in Z * N , respectively. For the sake of comparison it is assumed that other operations take zero time and z = n which means that ID = ID.
Since previous identity-based proxy ring signature schemes ( [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ) do not support provable security, they are not considered in comparison. All Traditional proxy ring signature schemes [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] are based on bilinear pairings, where some schemes [29] [30] [31] do not support provable security, and the provably secure scheme [27] presented by Yu et al. is not secure as shown by J.S. Chou [31] . Hence, we just consider the only provably secure proxy ring signature scheme [28] proposed by Li et al. in comparison. As shown in Table 1 , our scheme compared to Li et al.'s provably secure proxy ring signature scheme [28] has a proper advantage in efficiency since one pairing computation costs roughly 2.3 exponentiations according to the current MIRACL implementation [48] , a 512-bit Tate pairing takes 20 ms whereas a 1024-bit prime modular exponentiation takes 8.8 ms at the same security level, and with considering the most costly operation, pairing computation, the cost of PRVer algorithm of Li et al.'s scheme is as 4.6 times as that of ours and the cost of DeleVer algorithm of Li et al.'s scheme is as 2.3 times as that of ours.
However, it is obvious that the size of our signature is increased due to the size of public parameters in RSA problem, this scheme is the first identity-based proxy ring signature scheme form RSA (widely used assumption) assumption. Furthermore, all (identity-based) proxy ring signatures are not resistant against proxy key exposure attack [40] , while the proxy key exposure attack can not be applied to our scheme since it is sequential aggregation of delegation and proxy group's ring signature, and there is no proxy secret key stored in a less trusted device to be leaked.
Conclusion
In this paper, first, we formalized a security model for identity-based proxy ring signatures, then, we present the first provably secure identity-based proxy ring signature scheme. This scheme is the first identity-based proxy ring signature scheme from RSA, and consequently it is a response to the need of some companies for having identity-based proxy ring signature from RSA (sine they are reluctant to reinvesting in new implementation). Hence, it has a proper advantage in efficiency due to the avoiding pairing computations since the cost of each pairing computation is roughly that of 2.3 exponentiations. Furthermore, the proxy key exposure attack is not applicable to our scheme since it is generated based on sequential aggregation paradigm.
